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The case is made for applying Multicriteria Decision Models
(MCDM) to the Army's research and development (R&D) project
selection process. Given the recent changes in the international
strategic environment and the resulting congressional emphasis on
applied research short of production, the need for improved
efficiency in selecting Army R&D project alternatives is
increasing. R&D project selection problems are non-trivial, with
many stakeholders and multiple criteria for evaluating the
alternatives to meet the organization's various objectives.
Research on human cognition has revealed that typical notions
about decision making are inefficient for dealing with multi-
criteria decision problems. MCDM such as the Analytic Hierarchy
Process, Multiattribute Utility Theory, Goal Programming, and
Graphical Techniques are designed to support these decisions by
formulating logically supportable choices. Each of these four
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The quality of American technology has enabled us to
successfully deal with difficult military conditions and
help minimize the precious loss of life. We have given our
men and women the very best. And they deserve it.
President George H. Bush,
State of the Union address, January 1991
A . INTRODUCTION
The President's moving words of gratitude reflect the
enormous success of America's armed forces against Iraq,
largely wrought from our overwhelmingly superior application
of technologies to defeat naked aggression. His stirring
emotion had to fill those responsible with quiet assurance
that their efforts over the past several decades had been
vital .
At the same time, many in Congress were and are calling
for deep cuts in military spending. Yet no one in the
administration or Congress wants to dull America's
technological edge. How can the U.S. maintain, much less
improve its lead in the race for defense technological
superiority under these circumstances? Whatever the answer,
it will be multi-faceted and at least as complex as the
bureaucracy from which it is born.
Critical decisions in complex organizations are rarely
easy, especially those involving the expenditure of
significant public funds and with potential consequences
affecting the very lives of the men and women of our
nation's armed forces. The decisions about which
technologies are to comprise the Department of the Army's
technology base investment strategy are central to this
serious issue.
Given these changes in U.S. budget priorities as well as
national and global political and economic realities, there
is certain to be a call for heightened oversight and
accountability of the technology investment process. Thus,
in spite of defense management cries to reduce
micromanagement , scrutiny is sure to be more strenuous as
the reverse is less politically attractive or rewarding.
With increased scrutiny of the decision process will
come greater need for clear logic, consistency, and
credibility in technology investment decisions without
stifling creativity from heightened risk aversion. Analytic
decision models (ADM) , designed to support the
multidimensional decision environment of defense technology
investment, can fill this need.
Over the past 3 years there has been something of a
silent explosion in model development. Yet decision models
are not widely used by the very managers they are designed
to support [Ref . 1] . The purpose of this study is to
introduce Army R&D managers and their support staffs to the
virtues and limitations of some important project selection
analytic decision models (ADM) . Given the need and their
effectiveness, ADM's will have an ever increasing role in
obtaining logical solutions to problems of competing
priorities, goals and objectives.
B. DISCUSSION
Analytic decision models such as the Decision Matrix,
Hurwicz criterion, and Analytical Hierarchy Process are used
to structure decision making under risk and uncertainty and
may offer some support for the Army's research and
development (R&D) /technology base investment strategy
decision process. First of all, formal decision models help
to formulate a structure for all issues bearing on the
problem. They offer a rational process for assigning values
to the important factors on the basis of current priorities
and policy. Environmental factors such as the likely
international political climate may also weigh into the
problem and a "best" solution may be deduced from the
relevant, possible alternatives.
Research into the psychology of human judgment over the
past several decades reveals that, while the environment in
which decisions are made has become increasingly more
complex, the intuitive judgmental skills of the decision
makers has not kept pace. Rather than clarifying the
choices, ever increasing amounts of information often lead
to selectively "seeing only what we want to see." Filtering
information in this way, basing decisions predominately on
past experience, can adversely skew results. [Ref. 2]
Memory is another weak point in human judgment. Since
many decisions are constructed from the data, based upon a
reconstruction of past similar situations, limited memory is
a source of potential human error. Additionally, people do
not have good success judging probabilistic outcomes
regarding risk and uncertainty. People do not have innate
intuitive abilities to assess probable outcomes from random
input data. Formalized decision models can provide a
framework to organize input data which exposes these and
other sources of potential error, systematically minimizing
risk to improve results. [Ref. 3]
Perhaps the most important reason for incorporating ADMs
into the Army technology investment process is money. The
Department of Defense (DoD) annual budget will shrink each
year as a result of the President's agreement with the
Congress at the close of 1990. This trend is accelerating as
the apparent international military threat continues to
diminish and domestic economic needs mount. The Army will
have fewer dollars to spread around and R&D investment
decisions will undoubtedly become more critical in terms of
choosing "the right" programs. The current budget climate is
likely to intensify congressional scrutiny and program
manager accountability.
Steps to formalize the Army's technology investment
decision making could be taken at any point in the systems
research, development and acquisition (RD&A) process, but
should first be applied to the initial R&D investment
decisions to realize the greatest benefit. Given that the
Army's Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 investment in basic and applied
R&D will represent 14.4 percent of the Department of
Defense's $40 billion research and development budget, even
small improvements in effectiveness will yield substantial
expenditure results. [Ref. 4]
A formalized decision process using ADMs can structure
the decision process to reveal the logical steps used to
arrive at an investment choice. Such procedures do not
replace the decision maker. They provide a record of the
reasoning used to arrive at a decision. ADMs can incorporate
current priorities and readily adapt to ever changing
priorities, both planned and unplanned, funding decisions,
lessons learned, and shared experience from other programs
related to the current decision. This can ensure that no
single factor or factors are unduly weighted or ignored in
the decision and that decision maker bias is minimized.
Employing a formal decision procedure using decision
models may add stability and continuity, thus reassuring the
decision maker and his superiors. One of the findings of the
1986 Packard Commission and others assessing the failures of
the defense acquisition process has been the continual
turnover in defense programs, resulting in inconsistent
management and program turmoil. In his 1988 book,
The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition
,
Ronald Fox states that,
In the late 1980 's, military rotation and individual
military career considerations caused program managers
to be assigned to programs for an average period of
only thirty months, and the turnover is often higher
one or two levels below the program manager. [Ref . 5,
pp. 177-178]
Use of ADMs could help to minimize the turmoil caused by
personnel turnover by giving incoming managers awareness of
the logical progression of the choices that brought the
program office to its present position.
Once incorporated in the overall decision process, ADMs
could also lower the management learning curve aiding
continuity and further diminishing turmoil and confusion. As
a potential source of increased efficiency, ADMs might
reduce the perceived need for micromanagement by increasing
management confidence at all levels to which it was applied.
These are only some of the inefficiencies that ADMs were
designed to address. If resolving these inefficiencies is
truly a central goal of the present defense acquisition
process reform, formalizing the investment decision
procedures using analytic or economic decision models may be
one small step toward accomplishing a major part of that
goal. In any case, helping the Army's R&D investment
managers consistently minimize the risk and uncertainty of
their program choices may prove incentive enough for the
adoption of ADMs
.
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The aim of the study is to develop a basic understanding
of what decision support models are supposed to do for the
decision maker, their usefulness, and limitations for
research and development project selection decisions. The
research study will begin by describing the basic process of
initiating research and development projects and programs in
the buying commands of the Department of the Army (DA)
.
Rather than examining how the decisions get approved in the
budget submission and Program Objective Memorandum process,
this work looks at how the new program initiation decisions
are made at the lowest level, where operational concerns
have some degree of priority over budgets and bureaucracy.
The focus is on the application of ADMs for project
selection decisions in the area of basic and applied
research. It is hoped that the work will provide a single
reference point for the beginning user on the availability,
usefulness, application, and limitations of proven decision
support models for project selection problems.
The goal is to assess currently successful applied
economic and analytical decision models for use by the
Army's RD&A community. It is designed to aid those within
the Department of the Army (DA) charged with seeking
technology initiatives and promising, innovative, high
payoff opportunities to support the transition from theory
to application.
Currently the Army's technology investment program
decisions are predominantly made on the basis of the Army's
Staff Study procedure, whereby all viable alternatives are
presented to the decision maker with their apparent
advantages and disadvantages, based upon stated or implied
criteria, with a recommendation for the "best" possible
choice. The techniques introduced in this research provide
those who must prepare such studies with a model for
structuring each alternative's advantages, disadvantages and
criteria in order to assess probable outcomes upon which the
decision maker can logically evaluate the choices with more
than intuition alone.
D . METHODOLOGY
This study presents information collected through a
search of the current literature regarding DA policies for
program/project initiation procedures to describe the
current technology investment decision process in the
context of the Department of the Army's overall research,
development, and acquisition cycle. This information is
supplemented by telephone or personal interviews with the
authors of the Army Technology Base Master Plan ; the Deputy
for Technology and Assessment, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (R,D&A), and follow up with
representatives of the specific buying commands within the
Army Materiel Command, such as, the U.S. Army Missile
Command (MICOM) , Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM)
,
Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) and others. [Ref. 6]
The literature search provided some of the background
for an analysis of the application of analytic decision
models based on the types of decisions being made and the
factors typically bearing on relevant decision issues.
Subsequent analysis then details four prevalent analytic
decision models for multiple criteria problems that have a
significant record as effective aids to decision-making in
fields closely if not directly related to Army research,
development and acquisition (RD&A) program/project selection
activities
.
The data for this analysis will be derived from a review
of the works on the subject as well as personal interviews
with professors at the Naval Postgraduate School and other
experts in the field of operations research. This report is
not a lengthy scientific investigation into the worthiness,
efficiency, or absolute effectiveness of each analytic
decision model uncovered in the course of this research.
Instead, it presents scholarly opinion and advocacy of a
particular model's usefulness, situation applicability,
limitations, pitfalls, and/or any assumptions of those
experts who have used and/or developed subject models based
on both their written works as well as personal or telephone
interviews
.
The aim is to develop clear and sufficient evidence and
examples to allow managers of the Army's research and
development investment strategy and their staffs to decide
with reasonable confidence the usefulness of a particular
decision model to their circumstances. Each model catalogued
will be sufficiently detailed to permit the user to examine




II. THE ARMY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT STRATEGY
...with limited resources, an ever widening range of
technology opportunities, rising international tech-
nological competition, and an increasingly more capable
third world threat, the Army must invest where the
warfighting requirements and potential improvements are
greatest. [Ref. 6]
A. INTRODUCTION
There are certainly many reasons to consider improving
the efficiency and effectiveness of Army R&D investment
decisions. This chapter will explore the two central to our
discussion thus far. First, with reductions in the perceived
threat to American security abroad and the accompanying
reduction in defense spending, some in Congress have
expressed serious concerns about assuring America's
international preeminence in advanced defense technologies
development and assuring the maintenance of the defense
industrial base. The opening quotation serves to sum up the
Army's understanding of these concerns.
Beginning with Public Law 101-189, November 29, 1989,
Congress directed the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to
submit an annual plan for developing those technologies
considered most critical to U.S. defense qualitative
superiority. This in turn led to the Army's development of
its annual Technology Base Master Plan (TBMP) to incorporate
11
the guidance from the Secretary's Defense Critical
Technologies Plan . The Army TBMP provides the basis for the
way in which R&D decisions are to be made in the Army in
light of these congressional concerns. [Ref. 7]
Secondly, as described in the opening background
discussion, decision theory provides a sound basis for using
decision models in support of multiple criteria decision
problems such as those posed by the Army's R&D investment
process. These models may provide a logical foundation for
structuring the analysis by incorporating ADMs for specific
decision alternative choices. Thus, this chapter describes
the Army's research and development investment decision
process, followed in Chapter III by an explanation of basic
decision making theory.
B. THE TECHNOLOGY BASE INVESTMENT STRATEGY
The decision process whereby the Department of the Army
(DA) determines which key emerging technologies will be
funded for possible concept development is a critical step
in shaping the material warfighting capabilities of the
future Army. The decision to fund or shelve an emerging
technology can have far reaching implications for those
firms focused on defense applications as well as society at
large if the technology had proven useful in civilian
applications. Another concern is that a critical link in our
nation's chain of defense might be chopped from the Defense
12
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) because of the budget
cutter's ax.
The hard choices of what flies and what dies is sure to
leave many defense contractors gasping their final breath in
the 1990s. Should DA's decisions to fund certain development
programs be based solely on the needs of our ground forces
to overcome a foreign threat? Or, should the Army's
leadership seek to include the broader goals of supporting a
strong industrial base ready and able to deliver the
American-made war goods needed for the next theater of
conflict as well as the broad socioeconomic legislation all
government procurement is pledged to support. The issue of
supporting the technology base has already been partially
addressed in Congress and the Army Acquisition Executive,
Stephen K. Conver has acknowledged that goal. [Ref. 8]
One thing is certain: as long as the Army's Procurement
budget continues to shrink from $14.2 billion in 1991, down
to $11.6 billion in 1992, and projected under $9.5 billion
for 1993, the choices will become more difficult and the
consequences of an inefficient choice more severe. For, in
strictly economic terms, less Defense Procurement spending
means less diversification over fewer systems and less
private research and development spending by contractors
strapped by reductions in Defense Procurement spending.
[Ref. 9]
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The shrinking Army budget for fiscal years '92 and '93
will have a serious impact on Army R&D investment. While the
Army's investment in basic and exploratory research is
growing in response to Congressional concerns, compared to
the rest of DoD, the Army's share is declining. For example,
while the Army's share of the total defense budget for
Fiscal Year '93 is projected to be just under 25 percent,
the Army share of the total DoD RDT&E program is projected
to decline from 15.5 to 14.3 percent. A credible technology
research investment strategy will be essential to assure a
viable technology base for future Army systems and could be
a catalyst to reverse this trend. These factors increase the
Army's technology risk in several ways. [Ref. 4]
One risk is the shrinking industrial and technology
base. With declining defense spending spread over fewer
program new-starts, defense contractor funded basic research
is expected to fall. Fewer choices between contractors and
programs will mean that some key prime contractors may leave
the field and with them may go critical expertise. This
concern is perhaps even more acute for the lower tiered sub-
contractors who support the primes with precision science
and engineering skills. [Ref. 10]
We learned in the 70s and 80s that limited deployment
times meant "come-as-you-are-war " with no time to gear up
industry to overcome our material shortcomings. The
alternative may be to rely on the capabilities of allies for
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support in those areas in which we fall behind. Obviously
this is in part what Congress hopes to avoid by supporting
the Defense Critical Technologies Plan .
In sum, there may not be time to recover in a crisis.
There may not be the expertise to recover. We may not have
the resources to commit or divert to such a recovery effort
in time to meet the need. Reliance on allies leaves us
vulnerable in other ways. There is, as there has always
been, the potential that some important breakthroughs will
be overlooked entirely in the decision process, but this
risk increases as fewer dollars are spent on fewer programs
Before suggesting some ways to minimize these potential
risks in the decision process, it is appropriate to review
the way in which the Army selects research technologies in
which to invest will be presented. Although the entire
process is fairly complicated with many decision makers at
various levels, the following is a basic summary.
C. THE ARMY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT PROCESS
The Army has divided its research program into four
commands: the Army Materiel Command (AMC) , the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) , the Surgeon General, and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Each has responsibility
for developing technologies critical to their area of
expertise and each has a structure for managing various
15
aspects of the technology base to meet the needs of their
user community. [Ref. 11]
For example, AMC includes Laboratory Systems Command
(LABCOM) with leadership over seven Army Research,
Development and Engineering Centers (RDEC) and the Army
Research Office (ARO) . The Army laboratory structure
includes 42 laboratories and RDECs, complicating
communication and technology transfer. A LABCOM plan for
restructuring the Army laboratory system, called LAB-21, has
been included in the 1990 Base Closure and Realignment Act.
It is a six year program designed to streamline and increase
the productivity and efficiency of the Army's research and
development organizations. [Ref. 12]
The ARO on the other hand, interacts with the nation's
research universities, funding basic research in university
laboratories throughout the country. Any of these actors can
play a part in the process that determines which
technologies should be funded for further development in
this highly decentralized management structure.
The formal decision process also includes the "user
community" represented by the Army's Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) which has leadership over each of the Army
combat training branches, from Artillery, Aviation, Armor,
to the Ordnance Corps, the Signal Corps, and Medical Corps.
Each of TRADOC ' s combat and combat support training schools
publishes their annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) in which
16
they identify their greatest combat survivability and
offensive capabilities needs based on TRADOC ' s warfighting
doctrine for the Army and the threat capabilities
assessment
.
TRADOC then consolidates and prioritizes these needs and
hands them off to the Secretary of the Army. The Army's
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, chaired by Army
Acquisition Executive, Steven Conver, Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) marries
requirements with capabilities and funding. The result is
the Army's Technolocrv Base Master Plan (TBMP) which includes
their Technology Base Investment Strategy. [Ref. 13]
According to the 1990 Army TBMP, thirteen areas are
considered critical to the Army's future warfighting
capabilities. They are called the Army's key emerging
technologies. The list includes directed energy weapons,
biotechnology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience,
robotics, and others. Each of the thirteen "were reviewed by
Army technical managers, scientists, and engineers. Then
Army leadership approved the final list." [Ref. 5]
D. THE ARMY TECHNOLOGY BASE MASTER PLAN
The Army TBMP represents the Army leadership's top down
guidance, objectives, and goals and includes the Technology
Base Investment Strategy. It is intended to
17
...create an atmosphere that fosters technology-
initiatives and the pursuit of promising innovative
opportunities while providing sufficient flexibility and
funding to laboratory and RDEC Directors to seize local,
high payoff opportunities. [Ref. 6, p. 1-10]
The process of review and approval of the future
technology investment needs, from the MAAs to the TBMP, is
based on the experience, judgment, and intuition of the
decision makers involved. It is an annual process, beginning
with the RDEC Directors and their supporting staffs, up to
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development, and Acquisition (RD&A) . How the exact process
actually works is not clearly spelled out, but one source
summarizes it this way:
In the case of advanced technology transition demonstra-
tions, the Army employs a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) co-
chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and
Technology, DASA (RDA) , and the Assistant Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development, HQDA.
Submissions are made to a working group that is co-chaired
by the Army Materiel Command Deputy Chief of Staff for
Technology Planning and Management, and the Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, TRADOC . The working
group reviews candidate proposals and provides recommen-
dations to the SAG for new start approval. This procedure
began in April 1990 in response to the Office of the
18
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Critical Technologies Plan (CTP)
guidance. [Ref. 14]
In addition to its internal process of approval, all
Army programs have to be funded in the annual Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM) approved by the Secretary of
Defence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This step, POM
approval, is the juncture where a perceived need becomes a
budgeted requirement. It is possible that a critical Army
need (in the eyes of the users) could go unbudgeted in the
Army POM, conceivably leaving our forces vulnerable in a
critical combat area.
In addition to the POM, OSD publishes its annual Criti-
cal Technologies Plan for Congress. The Services are
expected to follow it in designing their TBMP's. The CTP
represents the Defense Department's judgment of the 20 most
important weapons-related technologies of the 200 or so
technologies recommended by the Services. Multiple criteria
are used to determine which technologies make the CTP.
Finally, priorities are assigned based on the judgments
of a working group with inputs from a number of defense
industry contractors. The final decision is made by a senior
committee representing individuals in the DoD and the
Department of Energy with management responsibility over the
National Science and Technology program. [Ref. 7]
This is a decision process steeped in the give and take
of group dynamics, political coalition building, consensus
19
and compromise among key stakeholders, their advocates and
adversaries. There are many actors and plenty of room for
inefficiency, if not outright error. The next chapter will
discuss additional sources of potential error in decision
making that can introduce inefficiencies of their own.
20
III. BASIC DECISION THEORY CONCEPTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Our goal thus far in reviewing the Department of the
Army technology investment strategy has been to demonstrate
that the process is not immune to the risks of human
decision making and their resulting inefficiencies. This
chapter will be a presentation of basic decision theory
fundamental to an understanding of the importance of
decision model application. The discussion will conclude
with an evaluation of the applicability of incorporating
analytic decision models into the DA process for potential
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness.
It should be noted that although there are many human
dynamics theories and models (such as the rational policy
model, the organizational process model, the bureaucratic
politics model, among others) affecting the process thus
described, their assessment is outside the scope of this
current work. While these human dynamics models may be
essential to the implementation of organizational decisions,




B. THE ROOTS OF ANALYTIC DECISION THEORY
The study of decision making under uncertainty has a
long past. Beginning in the 1600 ' s with the founders of
modern probability theory, Fermat and Pascal, it was shown
that outcomes over time could be quantified by the
likelihood of their occurrence. This probability of
occurrence times its known payoff can be summed to support a
choice on the basis of the outcome's expected value, which
is the average of all the potential payoffs. This idea led
to the belief that if we can quantify the payoffs and their
likelihood of occurrence, rational decision makers could use
this information in judgments involving uncertainty.
[Ref .15]
Decision making, however, is much more complex. The
complexity of rational decision making under uncertainty is
supported by a vast field of research on the psychological
profile of decision makers and spans the topics of
heuristics and biases, prediction theory, inductive
reasoning, causal schemata, conservatism, and risk
perceptions, to name just some of the broad categories.
Probably the most important work regarding the way
managers make decisions is being done by Dr. Herbert A.
Simon, professor of Computer Science and Psychology at
Carnegie-Mellon University. Professor Simon's work on how we
make decisions in organizations spans more than 40 years and
22
earned him the Nobel Prize in 1978 for his concepts of
"objective, subjective, and bounded rationality." [Ref. 16]
Basically, Professor Simon logically developed the
notions of rational decision making and pointed out many
important shortcomings in human cognitive abilities that
limit our ability to make rational decisions. For example,
according to Professor Simon, people;
• tend to limit the scope of the decision problem, the
factors impacting the choices, the alternative pros and
cons, and objective criteria in some way to 'bound' the
issue within their capacity and experience, discounting
data that doesn't conform to closely held beliefs.
• do not seek to optimize in their decision-making process
but, rather seek to select solutions that are good
enough
.
• attempt to construct means-ends (or cause-effect) chains
to solve complex problems in a series of steps to
achieve the ultimate ends in a hierarchical fashion.
However, the conscious integration of weighing values
against alternatives often becomes an increasingly
complex chain and is seldom attained in actual behavior.
• judge alternative strategies based on their experience
and prior opinions about the consequences that follow on
their choice of action. Obviously, no one can directly
know the consequences of all behaviors. So, the quality
of any decision depends on how close their experience
corresponds to the choice problem.
• often weigh information received initially and lastly
more heavily than information received in the middle of
a discussion on alternatives about which they must
formulate a decision.
• tend to classify problems as programmed and non-
programmed. In organizations the former tends to drive
out the latter. Non-programmed decisions are generally
solved by reducing them to a series of programmed
decisions. [Ref. 17]
23
One distinguished source on Simon's work made the
following observation:
... it is essentially impossible to attain objective
rationality. To do so the decision-maker must know all
alternatives, construct all appropriate means-ends
chains, assess expectations for all uncertain
consequences, etc. It is here that Simon's notion of
bounded rationality takes form. The decision-maker can
know these important aspects of a decision only within
the limits imposed by experience, knowledge, time and
effort available to search and study the decision
environment. [Ref 16, p. 39]
So where, one might ask, does that leave the rest of us
mere mortals? The answer lies in Simon's notion of
subjective rationality. For a decision to be subjectively
rational, it must:
• be the best choice dictated by the current state of
knowledge using all available data
• be congruent with the values, goals, and objectives of
the organization with regard to the decision criteria
• conform to the organization's subject experts'
collective judgment regarding alternative consequence
outcomes. [Ref. 16, p. 40]
None of this may be particularly earth shattering to
today's manager, but Professor Simon's 1977 book, The New
Science of Management Decision [Ref. 17], brought many of
these interdisciplinary concepts of decision theory together
for the first time. It not only identified the basic human
decision process and its foibles, but also provided some
exceptional direction for resolving non-programmed decisions
in organizations. It's an exceptionally positive book, in
that regard. It should be required reading for any manager
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preparing to confront multiple criteria decision problems.
Its 168 pages offer extensive management insight that might
otherwise take years of experience to attain.
C. RISK CONCEPTS IN DECISION MAKING
No discussion of the basics of decision theory is
complete without a comment regarding risk. After all, no
choice among competing alternatives would be difficult if
everyone knew with certainty the outcomes of each
alternative. The decision maker (DM) would choose the
alternative whose outcome best achieved the organization's
goals, assuming the DM were rational. The above discussion
of objective and subjective rationality sheds light on the
ways in which DMs deal with uncertainty in complex problems
given human cognitive limits. Risk management is another
important aspect of the R&D project selection decisions.
The concept of risk is closely related to the notion of
uncertainty. In terms of decision making, risk is the degree
of certainty that an undesirable outcome will occur as the
result of an action or event. To clarify this from the
common notion of risk, think of it this way. We could say,
for example that the risk of cancer among white males in the
U.S. is 25 percent, meaning that roughly 25 percent of all
white males will contract cancer in their lifetime. The
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degree of uncertainty determines the level of risk. If we
know an outcome is certain to result from an action, there
is no risk associated with the decision.
The confusion comes when we think of the popular notion
of taking action which reduces the uncertainty of a negative
outcome as placing us at a "higher risk." To continue the
cancer analogy, those who smoke all their lives actually
lower the uncertainty that they will become cancer victims,
yet we say they are at higher risk. In fact, we can predict
with reasonable certainty that they will indeed contract
cancer. This popular notion of risk actually shifts from an
event uncertainty to a timing and security uncertainty
involved with perception and fear. [Ref. 18]
In project selection, the risk of an alternative is
weighed against a subjective appraisal that its payoff will
exceed the resources needed to achieve the anticipated
result. The appraisal must include the concept of
opportunity cost (the payoffs foregone from the most
promising alternative opportunities) to be valid. The
greater the potential payoff of an alternative, the greater
the acceptable risk, within the resource limits imposed.
[Ref. 19]
Even the novice DM is basically familiar with this
concept of risk in choosing among alternatives.
Nevertheless, the impact of risks and their effects on
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choice cannot be dismissed. Particularly in austere budget
climates when risk aversion is likely to increase.
Risk averse behavior is a judgment bias that can
severely limit innovation in the technology investment
process and must be guarded against as any bias should be in
rational decision making. Some of the decision models that
will be examined in the upcoming chapters are specifically
designed to highlight risk levels to help the DM avoid the
inefficiency resulting from risk averse behaviors.
D. THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT
One final concept regarding complex decisions is the
notion of the decision environment encompassing the
organization making the decision. Fundamental changes in an
organization's internal and/or external environment can
dramatically alter the organization's mandates, goals and
objectives-the basis on which important decisions rest. In
the case of the Army's R&D technology investment decisions,
environment refers to the national and international
strategic, economic, and geo-political setting. As one
research scientist pointed out in this regard, "The decision
space is Markovian: Given today, the past and future are
independent [Ref. 20]."
The point is, as the Russian statistician, Markov,
theorized, the future state of nature depends only on the
present environment and cannot be accurately ascertained
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from the past because the future is independent of past
events. They are connected only by a sequence of events in
time. Because the outcome payoff of a course of action is
directly linked to the environment in which it results, the
DM's payoff assessment must incorporate his belief of the
future state of nature at the time that the program achieves
maturity. [Ref.20]
This notion is especially pertinent to a development
cycle conservatively estimated to take 20 years from concept
to fielding. It is this notion of Markovian independence
that has given operations research its broad footing and
support for the development of decision models. No other
discipline copes with this concept in a decision context.
E. DECISION THEORY SUMMARY
Risk, payoff, uncertainty, rationality, opportunity
cost, judgment, all relate to statistical probabilities in
choosing among outcomes, which can leave all but the
operations research analyst more than a little nauseous. The
point in providing decision theory is to help Army R&D
managers make better, informed choices supported by
technical analysis in their organizations, not to be better
statisticians
.
Even if no decision models are used to aid the decision
process, keeping human cognitive errors in mind can improve
decision quality. Models were never developed to replace
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human judgment but to enhance its capacity. The following
judgment biases and pitfalls are discussed in chapter I:
filtering bias
experience bias
to give priority to information by order received
memory capacity limitation
conformity to prior beliefs
causal chains of likely outcomes limitation
risk preference bias
independence of the future from the present
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IV. INTRODUCTION TO ANALYTIC DECISION MODELS
. . .
when asked to advise companies on the acquisition
of a computer, my advice was, before any commitment,
make a careful determination of its need and how they
would use it. I soon realized that this was poor advice-
a company only acquired the ability to make sound deci-
sions about computers by hands-on experience with them.
The first investment in a computer was not to be judged
by its cost saving potential-it might have none-but by
its contribution to intelligence capabilities and subse-
quent decisions.
Dr. Herbert A. Simon, 1977
The New Science of Management Decision
, p. 43
Dr. Simon's comment regarding his early advice to
companies' attainment of increased "intelligence
capabilities" can apply equally well today to multi-criteria
decision support models. These two powerful management
tools, decision models and computers, have a nearly parallel
development history. Decision support models of any
complexity are almost completely reliant upon computers for
their often lengthy computations. This can at once serve to
enhance a model's considerable utility and further shroud
its seemingly mystical results.
Multicriteria decision models (MCDM) can confound the
manager confronted with dealing with the models' results and
the analysts' technical interpretation. Although they offer
the manager improved leverage in enhanced decision making
capabilities, it has been widely documented that management
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places minimal emphasis on their use in actual decision
making [Ref. 1 and 21]. Yet, as one important source put it:
Whether a modeler's recommendations are accepted or
rejected, they must be questioned and understood. If
they are rejected, equally quantitative arguments may be
required to contradict the analysis.... The planner who
uses computers and formulas must be reckoned with. [Ref.
22, p.l]
A. BACKGROUND ON GENERAL DECISION SUPPORT MODELS
Although many decision support models have been
developed since management science got its start after World
War II, many are not well suited for R&D project selection
problems with multiple objectives. For example, Professor
William Souder of the University of Alabama, Huntsville, in
his 1984 book, Project Selection and Economic Appraisal
[Ref. 23], summarizes nearly the entire field in 150 pages.
However, the models he presents are those which primarily
focus on one objective -the project's economic benefit or
payoff
.
Economic decision models such as cost/benefit analysis,
break-even point, make or buy, return on investment, payback
period, and internal rate of return are all excellent and
may be absolutely essential to business decisions where
profits determine performance (if not out right survival).
Others, like the Simplex method and Dynamic Programming, use
a sequential approach to optimize resource allocation. By
allocating the scarce resource in question (personnel,
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space, machine time, funding, etc.) to the candidate
projects, as many of the candidate projects (or jobs) are
completed as the resource allows.
Both single objective and sequential decision support
models require that alternative action outcomes be known
with mathematical certainty and measurable in terms of the
subject resource (usually in dollars) . In the public sector,
this is frequently not the case. Many other factors weigh
into the problem in a free and democratic society from many
quarters and competing stakeholders. From benefits to the
local community to the nation's technology base, in terms of
jobs and welfare, to effects on the environment, to issues
of keeping annual program budgets fully committed - many
issues must be simultaneously addressed for a decision model
to be completely beneficial to the user. (See, References
17, 22, 23 and 24, if need be, for an excellent development
of the economic and analytic decision models mentioned
here) .
Obviously, if the choices between alternatives were
trivial there would be no need for detailed modeling of the
decision problem. If the DM is reasonably certain of the
outcome of each alternative project available and suitable
to comprise his R&D program in a future fiscal period, the
individual's intuition and judgment alone are sufficient.
However, most R&D project selection decisions are complex
for several reasons.
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They often involve a host of interrelated elements with
varying degrees of impact on the decision. Furthermore, the
experts upon whose judgments the DM may have to rely, will
often be stakeholders in the decision's outcome, with their
own varied priorities weighing in their decision criteria
[Ref . 26]
.
Expert input is valued, but may need to be standardized
or quantified to weigh considerations on a level basis, to
avoid lending undue credence to any particular point of view
[Ref. 26] . Essentially, if the trusted experts disagree on
the criteria and approach for weighing the value of
alternatives, and the outcome is critical, the decision is
non-trivial and the need to quantify qualitative
considerations and factors to structure the decision problem
should be apparent
.
B. THE MULTI -OBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT OF R&D PROJECT SELECTION
Consider for a moment the Army's Research, Development
and Engineering Center (RDEC) directors who are expected to
balance the many objectives listed in Table 4.1 [Ref. 6]
from Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , on
down to Army Materiel Command priorities. In addition, there
are a number of technology investment objectives that
conflict or complement these stated goals. Some current
examples include minimizing development time, life-cycle
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cost, damage to the environment, while at the same time
maximizing dual use technologies, performance capability,
TABLE 4 . 1 THE ARMY TECHNOLOGY BASE
STRATEGIES; Source: 1990 Army
Technology Base Master Plan [Ref. 6, pp.
1-9 - 1-10]
*Enhance warfighting
*Balance R&D between near, mid, and
far-term needs
*Balance between next generation,
emerging technologies, systemic
issues, and support capabilities
*Seize technology initiatives
*Leverage R&D outside the Army
*Reduce concept risk and development
times
*Foster innovation and seek high
payoff opportunities
and protecting the industrial and technology bases, all
within a projected budget limitation essentially beyond his
or her immediate control
.
This is the decision environment multicriteria decision
models (MCDM) were developed to handle and support. It is an
environment in which the decision maker (DM) must achieve
multiple goals with a given budget over a broad range of
continually changing R&D project alternative opportunities,
each with its own expected returns for achieving at least
some of the required objectives.
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How can project alternatives be compared to determine
which ones best satisfy program decision criteria? Where a
considerable budget is involved with frequently changing
goals, objectives, criteria and priorities, the decision
process will hardly be routine. As mentioned previously,
with increased scrutiny and oversight, expert opinion alone
may no longer suffice.
The basic answer to our "How to compare" question lies
in quantifying subjective judgments from experts in a
systematic, formal analysis of alternatives and objectives.
Some might conclude that complex issues in the public sector
should be left to subjective evaluations, but for many of
the reasons stated in the second chapter, it is quite often
inefficient to do so.
For example, although we may not be able to directly
quantify the value of several aircraft designs of near equal
cost- some offering improved performance, others increased
efficiency, and still others technological advantages- we
could ask experts to judge which design (s) is preferred over
the other and use the preferences to develop a rank
ordering. Quantifying the rankings and comparing them
against priorities and constraints can lead to a logical
choice among alternatives. [Ref. 27]
In conclusion, several important multi-criteria decision
models (MCDM) have been developed to support the kinds of
decisions facing the Army in its R&D project selection
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process. These are non-trivial decisions involving extensive
cost, payoff data, and opinion as well as many competing
goals, objectives, criteria and priorities. By organizing
the input data, quantifying expert judgments, and forcing
choices among competing criteria, MCDM can help the decision
maker (DM) overcome many of the inefficiencies inherent to
human decision making- namely, biases and error- discussed
in chapter III.
C. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE UPCOMING FOUR CHAPTERS
The next four chapters are designed for the management
DM who may not be aware of the potential of MCDM
applications for supporting R&D project selection decisions
in the public sector. The models chosen for presentation are
those MCDMs that predominate the literature of management,
management science and operations research. As such, they
are considered the most useful and widely recognized for R&D
project selection and other resource allocation problems of
this kind. These are the MCDMs which the management DM in
the public sector is most likely to encounter and for which
some knowledge of applications will be increasingly
important
.
We begin with a summary of some of the graphical
techniques for multi-criteria decision support developed
from several sources. We will then move to a development of
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) . Next, the
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Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT) will be detailed.
Finally, chapter VIII will present a development of the Goal
Programming (GP) method for solving problems of choice with
multiple criteria.
It is important to keep in mind that this is not a
technical development or analytical assessment. As a
management student curious about the power and limitations
of MCDMs , my goal is to spark the curiosity and inform my
peers about what management science is contributing to this
specific decision environment. As in an explanation of the
value and power of application software, the point is what
these tools can do for us, not the bits and bytes of how
it's done. A deeper understanding can and should be sought
from the primary sources listed as the references.
Throughout the discussion so far, several terms central
to decision support modeling have been used, the meanings of
which may be becoming somewhat blurred. To alleviate
confusion, the following definitions are offered to assist
the reader in keeping each term in focus:
• criteria: the measures of effectiveness against which
alternatives are evaluated.
• attributes: the variable outcomes contributing to pro-
gram objectives.
• objectives/goals: stated and implied R&D program
mandates and priorities.
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• constraints: the physical and economic limitations to
program optimization.
• alternatives: candidate projects for selection.
V. GRAPHICAL APPROACHES TO MULTI -CRITERIA DECISION PROBLEMS
We begin our discussion of multicriteria decision models
with a development of some graphical approaches to solving
the Army R&D selection problem. These techniques are
adequately covered in the literature of management science
for solving choice dilemmas with conflicting attributes. But
more significant is their flexibility. These models can
incorporate data from simple cost/benefit analysis to
sophisticated risk and utility functions if desired by the
DM.
First, the model will be presented through a discussion
of the development process to present some idea of how the
model works to turn input data into output recommendations.
This will be followed by a discussion of the technique's
strengths and weaknesses identified through research or
actual applications where available. The chapter will
conclude with further analysis of the limitations, pitfalls,
and strengths of this technique. Some comparisons between
graphical models and models to be developed in later
chapters will also be provided.
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A. GRAPHICAL MODEL STRUCTURE AND FORMULATION
Graphical techniques are a symbolic depiction of the
expected outcome for each alternative with respect to each
attribute. Subject matter experts establish the measures of
effectiveness criteria upon which each alternative is to be
judged and establish some effectiveness rating scale for
scoring the alternatives. For example, some objectives for
an R&D program might be to:
• Maximize utility and effectiveness (coverage such as
dual use technologies, interoperability, etc.)
• Maximize research personnel utilization
• Minimize development time
• Minimize resource consumption (funding, overhead, and
support costs, for example)
• Maximize "critical technologies" state-of-the-art
• Minimize development risk (such as outcome suitability
and contractor experience/ability to deliver)
Next, some measures of effectiveness (MOE) for each
objective would have to be established and agreed to by the
subject experts/stakeholders. Determining the program
objectives and adequate MOE for evaluating each alternative
project under consideration is the first step in applying
graphical techniques. [Ref. 28]
Some of these measures, such as costs, are hard criteria
for which reasonable data figures may be available. Some of
the others are soft criteria that would have to be based on
expert judgment, experience and intuitions of those
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involved. These soft criteria must be quantified so that
measures can be compared on an equivalent basis. [Ref. 29]
One way to do this is to establish "scoring functions"
or graphs which depict ratings for the predicted alternative
attributes (outcomes) for each of the selected criteria,
such as those shown in Figure 5.1. Both quantitative and
qualitative results can thus be shown. [Ref. 30]




























Figure 5.1 Example Scoring Function Graphs
One graphic technique for multiattribute decision
analysis presented by Zeleney, Canada and Sullivan, and
others, [Ref. 29, 30 and 31], is called Polar Graphing. This
method consolidates the results from scoring function graphs
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to visually demonstrate relative contributions of each
alternative's attributes. Two example presentations of the




Figure 5.2 Typical Polar Graphs
Polar graphs can facilitate decision making by revealing
those projects that make the greatest contribution to the
RDEC research and development program objectives. As with
many graphs, however, the axis, scale values can be
manipulated to represent the data in different ways for a
variety of interpretations.
One criticism of the polar graphing technique is that in
structuring this method of multicriteria decision modeling,
no author has formulated a specific way to weight the
criteria (represented by the "spokes" in Figure 5.2) for
evaluating the attributes (depicted as the "spider web"
linear values around the spokes) of the various alternatives
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in a consistent way. Although general "utility values" can
be chosen and assigned using the scoring function graphs,
this is considered highly subjective. While the model
analyst and DM may develop agreement on consistent MOE,
their interpretation and the resulting axis, scale values
might not hold up under close scrutiny. [Ref. 32]
This issue of MOE validity for the selected utilities
and their representation of the true values is dependent, at
least in part, upon the specific program objectives and how
closely the utility values and scores represent them. If the
scale values are accurately represented, the graphs may
reveal relative desirability between alternatives. Then, as
long as all experts and stakeholders agree which attributes
should dominate the selection criteria, a valid choice can
be made. [Ref. 26]
Looking at the example in Figure 5.2, another
shortcoming is evident. Clearly, with more than five or six
criteria and three to five alternatives, the aid this
presentation provides is rather dubious. It would do little
to clarify the choice considerations. On the other hand,
consider the inadequacy of traditional models, such as cost-
benefit ratios, that simplify the problem by limiting the
analysis of alternatives to a comparison of only two
criteria. A polar graph analysis could demonstrate the need
for greater clarity among alternatives. [Ref. 29]
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Another graphical method that at least partially
overcomes this visual complexity problem is suggested in
Keeney and Raiffa's Decision with Multiple Objectives [Ref.
27]. Their approach depicts the attribute scores of each
alternative in a "performance profile, " like that shown in
Figure 5.3. In this technique, the vertical lines depicting
the attribute scales are not standardized to an evaluation
rating or scoring function as with polar graphing.
Attributes/Evaluation criteria
(A (A,) (A,) (A« ) (A,)
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Figure 5.3 Example Performance Profile Graphic
However, the authors indicate that this can be done if it
clarifies the problem. In addition, Keeney and Raiffa's work
covers the development of weighted value functions for
determining preferences between criteria. [Ref. 27]
Graphic techniques used to support multi-criteria
decision problems are useful because they are intuitive by
design. The information presented can be used much as in a
traditional trade-off analysis assessing more than two
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criteria. The support staff officer can show a lot of the
information quickly and clearly without a lot of fanfare or
technical jargon to explain the approach. The results or
output supporting the decision at hand can be largely self
explanatory. This is particularly true for comparing self-
evaluation and cross-evaluation of alternatives, as seen in
the examples [Ref . 26]
.
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND WEAKNESSES
OF THE GRAPHICAL TECHNIQUES
The first comment heard regarding the value of the polar
graphs or the performance profiles is what scale values are
to be used and how are these values determined? In both
cases, Keeney and Raiffa's development of value functions
and utility functions can be used [Ref. 27] . In addition,
more familiar decision aids can also be incorporated, such
as net present value, internal rate of return, cost-benefit
analysis, and many of the other financial and economic
assessment techniques. Some authors suggest adjusting these
traditional value equations for risk and time factors to
further enhance their usefulness and accuracy [Ref. 33].
This is actually an important strength of multicriteria
graphical techniques. That is, they are extremely flexible
as mentioned at the outset. Many of the other MCDM that will
be developed in the upcoming chapters do not incorporate the
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traditional economic analysis formulas which may in part
account for the lack of use of MCDM in American business and
industry
.
In the often cited surveys by Matthew Liberatore and
George Titus regarding MCDM for R&D project applications,
none of the 40 respondents from 29 "Fortune 500" firms
queried in 1983 used MCDM in their R&D project selection
process. However, net present value and cost-benefit
analysis were reportedly used 74 percent and 62 percent of
the time, respectively. Clearly, for a model to be seen as
effective, it must first be regarded as important and
reliable by the intended user. On this basis, the graphical
approaches must be given high marks for user confidence.
[Ref. 21]
Another shortcoming cited by Vickers and Belton in their
1988 study on graphical techniques (which they refer to as
"visual interactive models") is the time and difficulty of
formulating these models and their accompanying displays for
real problems. However, the authors suggest the use of
several commercially available software packages to assist
DMs and analysts with formulations. They recommend Symphony
and Framework for the novice and Why , Hocus , Witness , and
Genetik for more advanced formulations by analysts. The
authors also present a complete model development with
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results from input by 60 student evaluators . Their work is





Dr. Milan Zeleny of the Graduate School of Business,
Fordam University argues effectively that polar graphs and
other graphic techniques are more than mere visual displays
because they serve to improve decision making. He points out
that most MCDM ease the decision process by separating the
problem into its sub-parts and guiding the DM to state his
preferences in a piecemeal fashion.
Zeleny argues that this only reorganizes the problem
rather than resolving the inefficiencies resulting from
bounded rationality. He explains that this is primarily
because such methods disrupt the holistic view of the
problem. It is the holistic view that is essential to good
decision making and the essence of human cognitive skills.
Graphical techniques, on the other hand, fit all the
essential pieces of conflicting information together to
diminish the role of the analyst/facilitator and increase
that of the decision maker. [Ref. 29]
In conducting this research it appeared that another
important weakness of graphical techniques for multicriteria
decision problems is the lack of data from users conducting
actual problem analysis. The only data found were from
hypothetical modeling of simple problems. This might be a
result of the fact that no particular author or group claims
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ownership of these methods to champion the research efforts
necessary. Additional field work needs to be done to prove




VI. THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS
Chapter VI will familiarize the reader with the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) for aiding the DM in determining the
optimum mix of R&D projects to comprise the program within a
limited budget environment. Much has been written about the
strengths and weaknesses of AHP and its applicability to
this particular problem. This chapter will present an
overview and description of how the model is formulated
followed by some assessments of AHP from users of the
technique
.
A. INTRODUCTION TO AHP
The Analytic Hierarchy Process was developed and
introduced by Professor Thomas L. Saaty of the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania and documented in his
1980 book of the same name [Ref . 34] . This technique is
quite possibly the most important for quantifying
qualitative expert opinion and judgment for decision
support, at least in terms of its ease of use, its parallel
to actual decision making processes, and its broad
applicability. AHP enjoys the widest acceptance among
managers of all the multi-criteria decision models that will
be presented in this work.
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This technique requires the DM to construct a hierarchy
with the organization's top objective, broadest goal, or
mandate at the top. Subsequent levels of the hierarchy
include more specific objectives, activities, or effects
necessary to achieve the top goal, such as those listed up
in Table 4.1, from the Army's Technology Base Master Plan
[Ref. 6]. The lower levels are the attributes of specific
alternative project choices (courses of action) that
contribute to the organization's objectives. The final level
is comprised of the specific projects themselves. An example











Figure 6.1 Sample Decision Hierarchy
The process of developing this decision hierarchy breaks
the decision down into its sub-elements and is designed to
get the organization to concentrate on where its resources
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need to be focused to achieve their ultimate goals. There is
little room for hidden agendas, nest feathering, or the
"underling problem" (wherein a subordinate seeks to maximize
personal aspirations regardless of their impact on the
organization's goals) when priorities are examined in this
process. [Ref. 22, p. 43]
The hierarchy development process can also disclose
relations and overlap of goals and projects. It is also
hoped that the process will help to examine justifications
in terms of "virtues" or planning criteria of future returns
on R&D. The hierarchy can help clarify what has been
omitted, where boundaries have been drawn sub-optimally
narrow, and where principles and programs extraneous to the
organization's basic mission are being used to justify
expenditures. [Ref. 35]
The hierarchical structuring of the decision problem is
to be developed to deal with three issues in the R&D
investment problem:
• How do we plan for research and development under a
multitude of uncertainties?
• How can we design and implement our R&D program so
that, if successful in its separate parts, it will
aggregate to a coherent system a quarter century hence?
• How can the organization, given a quality selection of
projects that emerge from our analysis of the above
questions, allocate our budget cost effectively so that
benefits of investments in technologies today will
accrue on schedule? [Ref. 35]
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Within the hierarchy itself, each element at a given
level, called "virtues" (or attributes), may also be
assessed as obstacles. As the hierarchy is developed, the
experts can evaluate the severity of the challenges posed to
operations if a given attribute were inadequately resourced.
The intent is for the subject experts to identify areas
where future funding will be needed to stave off potential
lags in capability. This is to orient the exercise toward
anticipating growth needs rather than simply extrapolating
trends. [Ref. 35]
The sub-objectives of the hierarchy can also be
established as priorities broken out by the organization's
divisions. The DM can use the hierarchy to assess the
relative merits of alternative programs, projects and
technologies. What emerges is a hierarchy of benefits that
can be expected to accrue to each program area. The
potential benefits can be discounted and thus used to plan
current investment over the organization's planning horizon-
one, five, or more years out. But this is just the first
step in the AHP analysis. [Ref. 35]
Once the hierarchy has been designed, the next step is
to elicit expert opinion to compare the attributes on each
level to one another to determine and establish the relative
merit of each attribute in terms of its contribution to
achieving the next higher level goal. The experts assign a
52
number value from a scale like the one shown in Table 6.1.
These scores (called preference factors) are recorded and
organized into a separate matrix for each level's elements
TABLE 6.1
SAMPLE PREFERENCE SCALE
IF attribute 1 is...
preferred to attribute 2
"Equally", then rank is 1
"Slightly" = 3
"Slightly more" = 5
"Strongly" = 7
"Always" = 9
The scores are then aggregated and standardized using
the formal theorems of matrix algebra to derive relative
weights for the projects at the lowest level of the
hierarchy. The experts' preferences are thus translated into
a project selection ranking of the alternatives with respect
to the attributes by revealing which projects are most
adequate for achieving the overall goal. [Ref. 25]
Although the matrix algebra calculations can get fairly
extensive with only a few levels of attributes and experts
scoring, software is commercially available to conduct the
calculations. The use of a computer software package is
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essential for quantifying the preference value judgments of
several experts from different departments or divisions.
[Ref. 25] 2
Each expert with input to the decision process must
make l/2n x (n-1) paired comparisons (where n is the number
of elements on a level of the hierarchy) . This means that a
hierarchy with ten alternatives, eight attributes, five
objects, and a primary goal would require 83 paired
comparisons from each expert. Because of this need for
extensive input data as well as the limits of human
cognition for making these comparisons, Professor Saaty and
others have recommended keeping the number of elements in
any level at no more than nine and the number of levels to
between three and five. [Ref. 25 and 36]
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND WEAKNESSES
OF THE AHP MODEL
In 1984, researchers conducted a multi-year study of an
actual application of the AHP method to the R&D selection
process of a pharmaceuticals manufacturing firm in England.
The application was conducted to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of AHP against those of other multiattribute
decision methods for an actual case. The study was not an
1 For additional information, contact Decision Support,
Inc. about "Expert Choice" at 4922 Ellsworth Ave.,
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 or call (412) 682-3844.
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experiment but rather an application of AHP in the public
sector. The problem required ranking ten alternative
projects against eight criteria attributes selected by the
firm's DM and his project managers. [Ref. 37]
The study is a good example demonstrating the
formulation process, model output, and user reactions. The
decision maker and his staff in this case regarded the
process of using the preference factor ranking scale
confusing and the extensive paired comparisons, described
earlier, as tedious. Even after explaining the preference
factor to the users, the authors reported many still made
errors and found that they could not remember how they had
ranked earlier alternatives to attribute comparisons the
further they got into the procedure.
The researchers were able to work the participants
through these formulation problems to obtain output the
participants found reliable. In spite of the shortcomings
they had cited, all of the participants found the process of
structuring the decision in an analytic hierarchy useful for
gaining insight and understanding of the important factors
in research planning. In fact, the authors report in their
conclusion that the R&D division of the firm has
incorporated AHP, with some recommended modifications, into
its routine R&D selection procedures.
In a 1987 follow up to this original research work,
Geoff Lockett and Mike Stratford found the R&D division at
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ICI Pharmaceuticals continued using AHP without the
technical advisors to guide them. The DM was utilizing and
acting on the numerical results obtained from the model . The
section managers and project manager found that formulating
the decision problem with AHP was helpful and the output
was useful. [Ref. 38]
However, Lockett and Stratford also stated that some of
the respondents (including the project manager himself) were
continuing to misuse the preference factor scale and changed
their input choices once they had additional clarification
on its correct use. The authors indicated that this was a
significant drawback to AHP since, in their opinion, "In
practice, judgmental models will have to be used without
technical advisors if they are to become accepted [Ref. 38,
p. 399]." In addition, after conducting a comparison, they
recommended incorporating multiatribute utility theory
(MAUT) methods for choices among similar attributes to
improve results.
Several other improvements have also been suggested by
researchers working with the AHP technique for the R&D
selection problem [Ref. 39, p. 305 and p. 345] In addition,
Professor Saaty has responded to the criticisms regarding
the data from value comparisons using his original
preference scale in a 1987 article in Decision Sciences . He
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suggests ranking alternatives with a relative proportion
method rather than his original scale values of 1-9. [Ref.
40]
There literally seems to be no end to the controversies
surrounding the value and weaknesses of AHP in assisting
decision makers to evaluate multiple alternatives with
multiple conflicting criteria. While one source would find
the hierarchic structure development awkward, others said
that it helped their understanding. Some decried the lengthy-
comparison process as unnecessarily tedious, while others
argued this was a strength of AHP through its development of
a kind of "average preference" value. In any case, the
overwhelming consensus in the literature is that applying
AHP to the decision process improved the quality of
decision making for the DM. But the method is not without
its critics, many of whom advocate alternative MCDM methods
of their own (see, for example, Ref. 25, 26, and 28.)
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VII. MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY THEORY
Another multicriteria decision model which has proven
useful for supporting the evaluation of projects for R&D
selection is multiattribute utility theory or MAUT. As has
been the pattern thus far, the chapter is organized in two
parts. The first will introduce the basic elements of the
model and its formulation and the second will review the
important literature regarding the model's strengths and
limitations. The goal is to allow the reader toAjarner some
notion of the value of this technique for supporting
decision problems with multiple objectives.
A. INTRODUCTION TO MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY THEORY
This important multicriteria decision model uses
theories from mathematics and economics regarding utilities
to quantify DM preferences. The first and dominate example
of this technique was presented by Ralph Keeney of Woodward-
Clyde consultants and Dr. Howard Raiffa of Harvard
University in their 1976 book, Decisions with Multiple
Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs . [Ref. 27]
The Keeney-Raif f a MAUT decision model uses fairly
advanced mathematical development and economics manipulation
to evaluate alternatives against multiple criteria and
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arrive at the optimal course of action to achieve the
desired outcome, goal or objective. Although its application
to the R&D project selection problem is not as well
documented as that of AHP, it has been widely applied to
many types of selection problems with multiple qualitative
and quantitative criteria. It must therefore be included in
any serious discussion of this class of MCDM.
Like AHP, Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT) begins by
determining the overall program goal, objectives,
attributes, criteria, and project alternatives and
organizing them into a hierarchy. The notion is to divide
the multicriteria problem into its basic component parts,
determine the DM's preferences on each component, and derive
the alternative that best fulfills those preferences. The
process can become fairly complicated. The following is a
narrative explanation of the steps in the MAUT procedure.
Once objectives, attributes, and alternatives are
determined, subjective measures of effectiveness are derived
and assigned to each attribute. Objective data are used for
this whenever available and applicable. The DM's quantified
values and/or expected values are thus established for each
attribute. Value functions are then derived by summing the
attribute values that represent the DM's preference
structure by assigning a weighting constant, an exponent, or
both to each attribute element of the function for each
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alternative [Ref. 41]. Several example value functions
adapted from those presented by Keeney and Raiffa are shown
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Figure 7.1 Sample Value
Functions for Hypothetical
Alternatives X, Y, and Z
Next, value tradeoffs are conducted systematically in
which the DM must decide how much of one objective he is
willing to give up to improve his chances of achieving one
of the other objectives. Outcome probabilities are used to
determine expected values where uncertainties are involved.
The tradeoff analyses are conducted between the alternative
value functions using marginal analysis as in classical
economics. The basis for this approach is that the utility
of any course of action under risk equals the expected value
of its payoff.
Multiatribute utility theory relies heavily on economic
principles of Pareto optimal analysis. A fundamental
assumption of this analysis is that for each act there is an
outcome, and the set of all the available alternative
outcomes which are most efficient comprises an efficiency
frontier for a particular decision maker. If we, as that DM,
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knew which acts (alternative programs) led to the most
efficient outcomes, and we were rational, we would choose to
do those acts to obtain the maximum benefits. That is, we
would choose the Pareto optimal set of alternatives. With
MAUT, the analysts use probability and DM preferences to
derive the DM's Pareto optimal outcome set. [Ref. 27]
The value functions and the outcome probabilities are
combined to obtain a utility function for each alternative.
The alternatives with the greatest utility for the DM are
those that should comprise his R&D program. Numeric values
can be determined for the attributes comprising the utility
functions so that a utility value can be calculated. Thus
the alternative projects can be rank ordered from greatest
to least utility for achieving the organization's goals.
[Ref. 42]
Obviously, the mathematical expressions get rather
lengthy with only a few attributes for each alternative. Not
only that, but the utility functions involve the integration
of the area under the theoretical Pareto optimal curve and
the curves can be monotonically decreasing or nonmonotonic
increasing in three space with additive or multiplicative
risk values! This is not the kind of analysis the typical
management decision maker is comfortable with. The tradeoff
analysis process for just three alternatives takes the
authors nine pages to explain. [Ref. 27]
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Utility theory says that the DM must assign a utility to
a course of action (project alternative) based on his
perception of the risk of the probable outcome for each
alternative. For example, if the most desired outcome were
only half as likely to occur at the conclusion of project A,
but a less desired outcome were sure to occur with
alternative B, the DM should assign a higher utility to
project B, and fund B accordingly. The point is, the DM
should act to maximize his expected utility. The DM's
perception of risk is factored in as well. If the DM is risk
prone or risk averse, he will naturally adjust his utility
for each alternative. [Ref. 22]
With MAUT the assumption is that DM preferences are
consistent and independent of each other. The idea of
decomposing a problem implies that there will be less error
from random judgments when the DM can focus on single
components of a decision problem. The central assumptions
are that the DM will make rational choices that optimize his
utility and that a decision is rational if it maximizes the
DM's expected utility.
One other point unique to MAUT is that the technique
allows for only one DM instead of inputs from multiple
experts. Utilities of multiple stakeholders are not
aggregated and factored in mathematically, but their
opinions should be weighed into the DM's utility function
for each alternative. The DM could call for subject experts
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to provide input to set attribute values and assist with
utility tradeoffs preferences. It would then be up to the DM
how he would use their input to weigh on his own judgments.
[Ref. 41]
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND WEAKNESSES
OF THE MAUT MODEL
First of all, do not feel intimidated if, having read
the above explanation, you're not sure what you read. This
seems to be a frequent response to utility theory in general
and MAUT in particular. In many instances this was the
typical user response. In comparisons with other techniques
such as AHP and goal programming, the outcomes for optimal
alternative ranking were strikingly similar. This often
reassured users of the method's value. However, the concern
remained that this model may be difficult to use without the
assistance of a competent analyst to work the DM through the
process (see, for example, Ref. 37 and 41).
This lack of understanding of how the MAUT quantifies
qualitative preference "data" and probable outcome functions
to obtain its rank order solution is the complaint most
common in application analyses uncovered in this research.
Many of the researchers have questioned the value of MAUT on
the basis of this concern, pointing out that the
formulation itself- the way value and preference questions
are themselves presented- may too strongly influence the
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optimal outcome results. More study should be done in this
regard, but some research has already shown that this point
does not negate the value of MAUT to decision makers in
actual practice. [Ref. 43]
One of the other common complaints about MAUT is the
lack of a means for sensitivity analysis. The value
functions and probability analysis leading to the utility
functions that comprise the model and determine the output
are not easily manipulated to answer DM's various "what if"
questions. In addition, if the value functions developed do
not accurately reflect the actual Pareto optimal efficiency
frontier, the output results will reflect the inaccuracy but
without the knowledge of the DM. As one author has remarked,
"For all its outward appearance of mathematical precision,
MAUT is highly subjective, is not intuitive, and presents
many difficulties in practice." [Ref. 30, pp. 256-257]
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VIII. THE GOAL PROGRAMMING MODEL
With this chapter the introduction to the primary,
important multicriteria decision models for R&D project
selection is completed. The goal programming (GP) method
will be explained here through a description of the
formulation procedures. This will be followed, as in the
preceding three chapters with a summary of the strengths and
limitations of GP for solving multicriteria problems such as
those facing the Army's R&D community.
A. INTRODUCTION TO GOAL PROGRAMMING
The Goal Programming (GP) technique for supporting
multiattribute decision making is a modification of linear
programming, using mathematics to spread limited resources
(time, manpower, funding, etc.) over multiple objectives.
Abraham Charnes and William Cooper are frequently credited
with first introducing this method in 1961. [Ref. 30]
Because of its longevity, many complete formulations of
the GP model for solving the R&D selection problem in the
public sector are available for further study (see, for
example, References 36, 44, and 45). Nevertheless, in their
1983 survey of 29 major "Fortune 500" industrial firms,
Liberatore and Titus found only four of the 40 respondents
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indicated that they were even aware of GP and none indicated
that they used the technique to support their R&D project
selection decisions. [Ref. 21]
B. GOAL PROGRAMMING MODEL DESCRIPTION
With linear programming the DM seeks to optimize a
single objective given the constraints imposed by the
environment in which the decision is made. It is very widely
used, for example, in scheduling machine operating hours for
various jobs. This is a well known example, where the
constraints might be time and materials with the objective
of maximizing production output to meet demand.
With GP on the other hand, the object is to satisfy a
number of competing objectives as completely as possible
with the given resource constraints . As in our production
example, we might set maximum production output as a goal
along with say, minimizing operator overtime (accounting for
worker safety and fatigue as well as expenses), minimize
machine set-up times (caused by switching from one type of
job to another) , and minimize finished goods inventory
stack-up at the next work station. [Ref. 22]
Each of these goals competes for the critical resources
of time and materials which must be conserved while filling
each of the competing demands as completely as possible.
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This is a classic GP problem. Because of this capacity for
handling multiple objectives, GP has been established as one
of the dominate, if not the predominate MCDM.
C. THE GOAL PROGRAMMING MODEL FORMULATION PROCESS
The goal programming technique is powerful because once
the problem is formulated into its linear objectives and
constraints, a sound feasible solution can be obtained for
the DM which is intuitive and logically supportable. The
model is also appealing because it is flexible.
Goals may be stated as absolute priorities, as
objectives to be sought in some ranking by priority, or
interval goal constraints can be specified with over or
under achievement boundaries. Although the DM may state
preferences between competing objectives as with AHP or
MAUT, there is no requirement to do so. [Ref. 22]
Weighting constants are not used in GP. Instead the
objective functions contain plus and/or minus deviation
variables, which represent surplus or slack resources that
can be applied to competing objectives in the formulation.
A negative deviation variable represents a floor limit set
by the DM, while a positive deviation variable is a ceiling.
Both plus and minus deviation variables (the dj + " factors in
equation 7-3, of Figure 8.1) in one objective function
designate an interval for required fulfillment. If the
67
objective is absolute, no deviation variables are included
in that objective function. [Ref. 44]
If absolute priorities are established for more than one
objective in the formulation, the goals must be ranked in
the DM's order of importance. Preferences can be expressed
in many ways, but AHP is often recommended if a number of
tradeoff comparisons must be determined. [Ref. 22]
Once linear objective functions are constructed from the
DM preferences, the GP technique uses a preemptive goal
algorithm to maximize each objective. This means that lower
importance goals are only considered after all higher
objectives are fulfilled. Priority coefficients (the P k
factor in equation 7-2 in Figure 8.1) can also be
established to indicate priorities where slack or surplus
resources should be assigned by DM preference.
Find. . .X={x1 ,x2 ,xi . . . ,xn ) (7-1)
Maximize. . .Q=^Pk-f(dj ,dj) (7-2)
s. t. . . .^a^Xj+dj-d^Cjd -3)
Figure 8 . 1 Example Goal Programming
Formulation
Figure 8.1 contains a generic GP formulation that
includes each of the elements discussed so far. In this
example formulation, the Xj factors are the project
alternatives, the a tj is a coefficient value associated with
a particular project (a quantity of resource j for
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alternative i, for example), and c
D
is the goal or
objective value for constraint j. [Ref. 30, pp. 289-290]
As this explanation may indicate, formulation of a
multiple objective decision problem with competing
priorities, and constraints into a mathematical model is no
simple task. Goal programming is a recipe for transforming a
problem, such as R&D project selection, into a model from
which a solution can be derived.
To summarize, there are three basic steps in the
formulation process:
• Determining the aspiration levels for goal constraints
• Determining the slack or surplus allowed for each
objective and the priority (if any) by which each is to
be allotted to competing objectives, and
• Development of the objective functions.
D. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND WEAKNESSES
GOAL PROGRAMMING MODEL
Although formulation of the specific GP model itself can
be formidable when each step is straight forward, there are
two assumptions that must be dealt with even before
formulation can begin. First, each objective function
derived will be linear and second, all goal constraints must
be quantifiable for mathematical formulation.
Both of these assumptions must be understood and agreed
to by the DM before the objectives can be quantified and
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formulated into a value function. Take for example an
objective, "to minimize program risk."
Development risk should decrease over time, as
complications are worked out of the design approach.
Schedule risk, on the other hand, may increase or decrease
several times as the project continues, but it will most
certainly not remain linear. In either case assumed
linearity of the risk factor may or may not be significant
enough to invalidate the model's output. After all, it is
only a model. But generalizations of this kind can adversely
effect DM confidence in the output reliability, thereby
virtually invalidating the entire modelling effort.
[Ref. 45]
As for quantification, quantifying constraints like
time, funding levels, personnel and materials is fairly
routine in a GP formulation. If, however the DM's objectives
are to "maximize benefit, capabilities, or value of the
research efforts", GP alone will not suffice. [Ref. 46]
One way to quantify the intangibles is to employ other
techniques, such as AHP, to quantify qualitative factors and
use the output as input to GP so that the problem can be
formulated. An example of combining the two procedures was
conducted for the U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command in
1987 to determine R&D project selection given the program's
multiple goals and constraints. [Ref. 36]
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One important strength of this model is its ability to
handle a vast number of constraints and objectives to
evaluate numerous alternatives. In Dr. James Ignizio's work
for the Army on R&D project selection, his goal programming
code handled problems with over 100 variables, over 2
constraints, and from three to five objectives [Ref.
44, p. 271]. Captain Anderson obtained reliable output for
the Army Strategic Defense Command using his formulation of
five objectives and 35 constraints to evaluate 35
alternative projects [Ref. 36, pp. 49-59]. However, there is
a limit
.
In their GP work, Choo, Wedley and Lam reported that
their model "exploded" (a computer term for an endless loop
which yields no feasible solution) with any evaluation of
over 53 alternatives. The authors also pointed out however,
that this figure was a matter of the software program used,
the number of priority coefficients used in the objectives,
and the extensive outcome probabilities used for each
alternative. [Ref. 47]
Finally, some researchers have argued effectively that
the assessment of the DM preferences, priorities, and
deviation variables in the GP formulation process is
actually a search for the Pareto optimal alternative, as
described in chapter VII. They point out that ignoring this
fact can lead to suboptimal results. Halme and Korhonen, for
example, develop the theory (with proofs) for incorporating
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utility theory into the GP analysis in their 1988 work on
multiple objective optimization problems. [Ref. 48]
These references to research on the integration of
several models is added to alert the reader. Overlap between
the dominate MCDMs may be encountered in actual decision
applications. This research effort indicated that successful
applications blended the strengths of at least two models.
Although this strategy may increase formulation time, the
results have been encouraging.
Goal programming is considered the first true MCDM. It
has been evaluated and assessed widely, particularly
overseas, over the past three decades. Almost without
exception, the response to its results for improving the
quality of decisions is overwhelmingly positive. However,
the results of Titus and Liberatore's survey of top
management from 29 "Fortune 500" companies in 1983 revealed
that not only did American business not use this technique
for R&D management, over 85 percent indicated that they were
unaware of it. This indicates a clear disconnect between the
management science model developers and the managers who are
the users of these techniques. [Ref. 21]
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IX. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
There are many quantitative techniques available to
aid the decisionmaker (sic) in arriving at a choice that
has a high probability of meeting his objective.... The
military decisionmaker must consider the ideas and
approaches that decision technology has to offer. [Ref.




The decision models presented in the last four chapters
represent the state-of-the-art in American management
science efforts to assist decision makers solve
multicriteria decision problems. None of them will replace a
decision maker or diminish the responsibility for the
decision made. Each of them is after all, a representation,
a model of a non-trivial decision process. They help to
expand the bounds of rationality for those involved in the
decision by prompting an analysis of as much of the
available information as the decision maker desires.
Each of the four modeling techniques represents a
slightly different view of how complex decisions are
structured to get a handle on and resolve the critical
issues. For the Army Research, Development, and Engineering
Centers, the problem is how to allocate limited resources
over an ever widening range of technological opportunities
to achieve each of their goals to the greatest extent
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possible. This is a common problem that many of the authors
and researchers identified herein have been working on for
business, industry, and government for several decades.
These models are not static, but are continually being
reshaped to meet the needs of the user community. The users
are international in scope, from Europe to the Pacific Rim
and Australia. In fact, the models introduced in this thesis
seem to be enjoying their greatest acceptance and
application in Europe and Japan, according to the work at
the International Conference on Multiple Criteria Decision
Making [Ref . 39]
.
Decision theory in general and MCDM in particular will
grow increasingly important to decision makers as the models
become more sophisticated and user oriented. In 1983, The
Harvard Business Review quoted Robert Newman of General
Electric :
Within 10 years, decision theory, should occupy the same
role for the manager as calculus does for the engineer
today. The engineer of Roman times was unaware of
calculus, but he could make perfectly good bridges.
However, he could not compete today, even in bridge
building, let alone in astro-engineering. Management
today is at the stage of Roman engineering. Needless to
say, managers will still use specialists, just as
engineers use heat transfer experts. [Ref. 50, p. 149]
This was not exceedingly prophetic, but rather a statement
of the obvious. Decision models may not be as important as
calculus yet, but their potential benefits for improving
decision quality are enormous.
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B. SUMMARY
For the Army research and development project selection
problem, MCDM hold a great deal of promise. With increased
pressure from Congress for the Department of Defense to
assure America's technological defense superiority in the
face of dramatically reduced defense spending, there will be
increased scrutiny and accountability for the Army's R&D
resource commitment decisions. Multicriteria decision models
offer a means to develop logically supportable solutions to
this issue.
The Army decision maker will rarely know with absolute
certainty which R&D alternatives hold the greatest promise
for achieving the Army investment strategy objectives. The
final choice will likely be something of a compromise, a
tradeoff among judgments based on quantitative and
qualitative factors and valued expert opinion on potential
benefits, risks, costs, and payoffs.
These intuitions from competing stakeholders must be
assessed on a level basis, as free as possible from human
biases, and in keeping with organizational values. Multi-
criteria decision models can incorporate these elements,
organize the decision criteria, and quantify subjective
opinion regarding alternatives' relative merits so that the




Furthermore, the limits of human cognitive skills
introduce additional inefficiencies of their own.
Multicriteria decision models can bring structure to these
non-trivial decisions and systematically aid the decision
maker to overcome the random errors common to multicriteria
problems of choice. Clearly if a decision problem can be
effectively modeled, then the quality of the decision can be
improved.
In sum, the quality and efficiency of the Army R&D
resource commitment must increase. The decisions to commit
resources to achieve organizational goals and execute
mandates are perhaps the single most important function of
any leader. Nevertheless, precious little time can be
dedicated to a comprehensive analysis of all of the factors
that support these decisions. Multicriteria Decision Models
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